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Myth/Hustory and Past in the Poetry ofEavan Boland
CHRISTIAN HUCK, UNIVERSITY OF TUBINGEN
Perceiving herself to be without a specific tradition, Eavan Boland is especially
interested in the constructions and presentations of the past. By analysing two ofher
poems [ will present an account ofher understanding ofthe different concepts of
myth and history. In Tmago’, for example, Boland is debunking traditional Irish
myths.” She deconstructs not only one particular myth, but Irish myths as a whole:
the ‘blackthorn walking stick’, the ‘old tara broock’, ‘bog oak’, ‘harp’, ‘wolfhound’ etc.
That these mythical foundations are mostly nineteenth-century constructions of
Irish origins is well known, and the unmaking of myths is a current feature of
Anglo-Irish poetry after Yeats. Boland, however, seems to be more interested in the
complex ways a myth is made to function than to show the falseness ofthe mythical
story.
In this paper I will examine Boland’s attitudes towards the presentation of the
past in both myth and history, and the relation of both forms of presentation to
the ideal of an unmediated past, that is, to an account of the past not distorted
by the medium in which it is presented. The bottom-line of this analysis will be
that every form ofpresentation ofthe past is a construction and an attempt to re-
present something that is forever lost. Unfortunately, this insight does not free
one from the duty ofcoming to terms with the burden of an unchangeable past,
or, as Boland said in her autobiographical prose work Oéject Lessons: ‘Yet in the
end, in my need to make a construct of that past, it came down to a simple fact.
I had no choice.” I will argue that it is necessary to understand the concept of
30 A.E., Treland, Past and Future’ in Sociological Review 1a.2 (Apr. 1922) 13-14. (Later issued as a
pamphlet.) See also A.E.’s Sept. 1921 pamphlet, Ireland and the Empire at the Court ofConscience (Dublin:
Talbot, 1921), which, like the Interpreters, take the form of an unresolved political dialogue. 31 A.E,A
Confession of Faith'in The Irish Statesman 1.1. (15 Sept. 1923) 3-5.
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culture as it was developed in the late eighteenth century to fully grasp the
difference Boland makes between myth and history.
In ‘Tmago’ we can see that mythical allusions are presented in the form ofgram-
matical ellipses—sentences without verbs. The poem’s speaker realizes how it was
possible that these static images were once powerfully alive. She knows now that it
washerselfwho gave significance to these representational forms, she took them for
real and thereby supplied life to the inanimate objects. Instead ofbeing the acting
subject, the speaker subjected herselfto the prefabricated objects.
Now, as a grown-up, she has gained insight into these mechanisms. It was she
who made the images work, and she lays open what they are without her supply of
meaning: they are just simulacra, the outcome of mass-production, acquiring their
meaning only by endless repetition, and not due to any link to an original. The
supposed original, which is thought to be the foundation of these appearances,
rather is the corollary of its own effect. There is no depth to the surface, no figure
behind the masks. The speaker considers these images to be ‘anti-art’, they merely
reproduce old stereotypes and clichés rather than pull back the shroud ofwonted
perception. If modern art tries to lay open the untransmissability ofthe past, these
images simulate a continuity between past and present. This apparent continuity in
turn simulates a necessity for the pain that has been suffered in past times. The
images of a mythical Ireland are, to speak in the vocabulary of the poem, ‘the
walking-stick’ to follow the ‘way’ that was ‘traded by history’.
In an earlier poem from 1990 we can witness the consequence of an analysis
of the function of mythical images. In “Outside History” the speaker declares, ‘1
have chosen:/out of myth into historyI move to be.s But before I have a closer
look at this poem, I will try to tackle some of the pending questions concerning
the status of myth and history in this concept. How can it be possible to choose
between myth and history? Is it wrong to delieve in myth? What has happened
to myth, if it has become merely a ‘walking-stick’ to trod down the ‘way to make
pain a souvenir’? What is the advantage of history, if it is a construction all the
same? To give some hints at how it might be possible to approach these questions
I will try to present a brief outline of the development the terms ‘history’ and
‘myth’ have undergone since the Romantic period. (I'm sure it’s unnecessary to
point out that such a project can only be sketchy and incomplete here.) I will
argue that in the late 18th-century the fundamental difference between an
observation of the world, on the one hand, and the observation of how people
observe the world, on the other, was widely experienced for the first time.
Because of this new mode of observation the focus of interest shifted from
questions about the constitution of the world to questions of Aow people actively -
constitute their world by observing it, i.e., how they make sense of the world.




In Tmago’ we find the exemplary form ofsuch an observation ofan observation.4
The speaker talks about how she, when still a child, thought the images were true
presentations of a real past. By comparing the way she conceived the same images
once as true presentations and now as hollow forms, she is enabled to acknowledge
the different meanings one phenomenon can have when viewed from different
perspectives. We can see how this second-order observation is doubling the pheno-
mena under consideration: a thing is not merely this or that, but is what it is due to
the way in which we understand it. The thing also has a function, a function it does
not own merely through its being, but through the way we think about it. It is well
known that both literature and the fine arts in modern times became increasingly
fascinated with the observation of people who are themselves observing, and
Velazquez famous painting Las Meninas is only the most prominent example of this
phenomenon.s The late eighteenth century witnessed an exponential rise ofview-
points, and romantic poetry became obsessed with the observation of observations
—be that one’s own or somebody else’s.
Following Raymond Williams, one can say that the term ‘culture’ is an invention
of the eighteenth century.® Culture from then on is no longer the cultivation of
something natural, but culture in opposition to nature. This distinction, between
nature and culture, became prevalent. Regardless whether this development was
understood as a rise above the determined life of animals, or whether it was con-
demned as the irretrievable loss of community, it nonetheless brought into being a
split that was not to be amended until today. But the important point is, as the
German sociologist Niklas Luhmann stressed, that culture was born with the
‘Geburtsfehler der Kontingenz’ (‘birth-mark ofcontingency’)’—it was never ‘culture’
in the singular, but cu/fures from the beginning. The discovery of a distinctively
cultural sphere depended on the expansion ofregional and historical comparisons
of the ways in which human beings organize their communal living. It is well
known that the eighteenth century was fascinated with other cultures (hence the rise
of ethnological research), and for the first time in Western History it also mourned
being cut off from direct continuity with classical Greece and Rome. It became
obvious that every single specimen of culture could not be described as being
necessarily the way it is (otherwise it would be natural). Therefore one can say that
4 1 understand observation as a mode of perception using distinctions, where only one side of the
distinction is present at any one time. For discussion of the theory of observation and distinction, see
Heinz von Foerster, Observing Systems, 2nd ed. (Salinas: Intersysterns, 1981). 5 For various examples in
the history of art see Susanne Liidemann, ‘Beobachtungsverhiltnisse. Zur (Kunst-) Geschichte der
Beobachtung zweiter Ordnung’, Widerstinde der Systemtheorie. Kulturtheoretische Analysen zum Werk Niklas
Lubmanns, ed. Albrecht Koschorke and Cornelia Vismann (Berlin: Akademie, 1999), 63-75. For poetry
see Peter Hithn, “Watching the Speaker Speak: Self-Observation and Self-Intransparency in Lyric
Poetry’, New Definitions ofLyric: Theory, Technology, and Culture, ed. Mark Jeffreys (New York: Garland
1998) 215-44. 6 See Raymond Williams, Culture and Society 1780-1950 (London: Chatto and Windus,





every culture is generated from the discovery of an outside, an outside itself
comprised ofother cultures. There is no culture without culture-contact—a pheno-
menon that Gregory Bateson describes as schismogenesis.®
The newly arising interest in mythology in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth century can, I think, be understood as a reaction to this experience of
contingency, which itself is a corollary of the multiplication ofviewpoints and per-
spectives. Crudely simplified, one could say that the attempts to reinstall the mythical
were attempts to reduce this contingency, to undo the doubling ofperspectives, to
“heal the split between (determining) nature and (freeing) culture. I will now try to
give a rough outline ofthe complicated logic behind this desire for myth.
The possibility to compare one’s own culture with other cultures makes obvious
that life can be different. This discovery at the same time frees one from super-
natural necessities and comforting security. The safety of fate gives way to the
chances offreedom. The call for new myths or a Neue Mythologie then is the search
for a form of living that secures the newly gained freedom of individuality and
compensates for the experienced loss of community. Now the freedom of individ~
uality would have to become a necessity itself. But to be a necessity it would have to
be incomparable, because the possibility of an outside position that compares
different forms of living would inevitably produce contingency. The new myth
would have to make a culture unique, it would have to be exclusive. But this desire
for an exclusive culture reveals a paradox, because an exclusive culture would cease
to be one. The very point of the concept of culture was that culture emerges only
through culture-contact. So, as long as there is an outside, the mythical existence
that is aspired would always remain one culture among others. The myth a poet offers
a society would not be able to lose the flavour of fictionality as long as there is such
a thing as a cultural outside. From the outside position the myth would always
appear as an ideology, as one way to see the world, and the mythical community
would have to deal with this allegation. As I understand the desire for myth that
arose around 1800 in Europe, the aspired myth comprises exactly those things that
are felt to have been lost through the contingency of cultures: necessity, wholeness,
security. But as long as the new myth radiates its intentionality it misses the very
point ofits desired existence: necessity: The very desire for myth makes it impossible
to create one, because the fulfilment of that desire implies a creative making that
destroys the necessary giveness of myth. The fulfilment of the desire for myth is
interrupted by its own desire, and a new myth cuts itself offfrom being through its
own attempt to be.? A myth that is brought into being against this interruption
cannot be what it was intended to be.
8 Gregory Bateson, Steps to an Ecology ofMind (New York: Ballantine, 1972) 61-72. 9 See Jean-Luc
Nancy, The Inoperative Community, ed. Peter Connor, trans. Peter Connor et al. (Minneapolis and




However, after the obsession with mythology during the romantic period, the
interest faded. Rather then to re-enchant the world through poetry, the novel became
the prevalent literary form of the nineteenth century, and with it the search for
authenticity. Culture, as I argued, was born as culfures, and was never an exclusive
entity. At the same time an equally complicated construction was developed—the
nation-state. In a complicated procedure, the association of culture and state gave
birth to an utterly new understanding of history, both as object and as record. This
new form ofhistory is not about genealogies anymore, about the right ofpower and
its glorification, as Foucault describes it.” He has shown how the emergence of
counter-genealogies in Europe, which was suddenly crowded with memories and
ancestors for whom there existed no genealogies, made evident that the right of
birth is a right based on chance and luck. It became clear that the history ofthe one
1s not at all the history of another—the history ofthe winner is not that ofthe loser.
But, and here I differ from Foucault, the emerging space between the genealogies of
kings and emergent counter-genealogies was soon to be filled by the history of the
nation-state, which was built on culture rather than genealogy. The history of the
nation took as an advantage the very contingency with which it was plagued.
Although the coming into being of a culture and a nation-state could not be des-
cribed as a necessity, the new history could give a detailed description how it
transpired that something so improbable came into being none the less.
It was Hegel who first defined the elementary difference between genealogy and
the kind ofhistory that emerged in the nineteenth century. I quote from his Leczures
on the Philosophy ofHistory: Family memorials, patriarchal traditions, have an interest
confined to the family and the clan. The uniform course of events which such con-
dition implies, is no subject of serious remembrance ... it is the state which first
presents subject-matter that is not only adapted to the prose ofHistory, but involves
the production of such history in the progress ofits own being.™ History from now
on is regarded as objective, it is freed from the burden to give meaning to the past—
what happened just happened, and the historian should present it wie es eigent/ich
gewesen—how it really was—as one of the founders of modern historicism,
Leopold Ranke, famously remarked. The nation-state (in ideality) is defined by its
success and its future prospects, not by its (non-existent) past. (It is beyond the scope
of this paper, but, I think, explainable within its parameters, that the rational history
of the nation was notoriously grounded on some foundational myths.) It was then
that the task to make the past 2 meaningful space was excluded from the evolving
scientific community of historians, and passed on to (global) philosophers and
(local) writers. The distinctive feature by which to discriminate between history and
what could not be regarded as history shifted from the distinction between truth
and falseness to that of truth and fiction. Facts and fiction were intended to be
10 See Michel Foucault, I/faut défende la société (Paris: de Seuil, 1996). 1t G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy




neatly divided. It does not matter here how rigid this distinction was and is, how
much récit there is in discourse, how much discourse there 1s in Aistoire, and how much
truth there is in fiction.
It does matter, however, that this conception contains its own problems,
problems that Nietzsche famously brought to attention when he accused the
exclusively factual history of the historian to be uninbabitable. This could of
course not undo the prevalence of history, but did on the contrary, by intensifying
the desire for myth, make it an even more apoetical task to create a myth.
Bearing these concepts in mind, I want to come back now, after a long detour, to
Eavan Boland’s poem ‘Outside History’, and, especially, to the speaker’s decision
to move ‘out of myth into history’.
Boland describes in her autobiographic Obyect Lessons how she found herself
to be completely absent from Irish historiography—both as a women from the
official history, and as a female writer from the literary history. For the women
poet there is no nightmare such as that from which Stephen Dedalus tried to
awake. However, to move into history is in no way a move into paradise, rather
it is described as a2 move into ‘a landscape in which you know you are mortal.’ To
leave myth behind is a loss of the ‘place where you found you were human’. Myth
was able to make sense ofpain and suffering by presenting it as unavoidable, but
only, I think, as long as the myth is not recognized as one. The term myth is, as
I tried to show, of paradoxical nature. It is a nomination that thrusts aside the
very thing it is supposed to designate. Therefore the discourse about myth becomes
itselfa myth. It pretends to speak about something it cannot get hold of: to speak
of myth always means to speak about its absence from the world from which one
is speaking. For the speaker in ‘Outside History’ the possibility to choose
between myth and history already means that myth is viewed from the outside,
and so the move out of myth happens simultaneously with the acknowledgement
of the very possibility to move. We find no time of indecision, of contemplating
the pros and cons, in the poem. The decision to move follows directly after the
discovery of the possibility to move.
My point 1s that once the speaker knows she can move, once she is able to
compare and consider possibilities, she cannot do otherwise. From the perspective
of the speaker the mode of myth can be observed as something that prevents a
group ofpeople from acknowledging the suffering in their community. Neither is
history (the history ofthe nation-state as developed in the nineteenth-century), of
course, true to the suffering that happened in the past. The official historiography
seems to speak for the dead to silence the ghosts of the past. However, here, in the
realm ofhistory, the speaker finds the place and the possibility to try to acknowledge
the pain, and the suffering, and the dead. The discourse ofhistory makes it possible




But still, this does not change the fact that every presentation of the pastis a
failed representation, that it can never make present what is forever gone. It is
obvious that, as the speaker says, ‘we are too late. We are always too late.” Only
“when we throw away the ‘walking-stick’ that kept us on our ‘way to make pain a
souvenir’, might we be able ‘to kneel beside them’ on ‘those roads’ and ‘whisper
in their ear’. Something that an outsider, like the ‘stars—iron inklings of an Irish
January’ in the first stanza, are never able to. And poetry, rather than folktales or
scientific accounts of history, may be able to write close to, or even on the border
of the unrepresentable, because poetry is constantly questioning its own mode of
presentation; it draws attention simultaneously to its constructedness and the
need to construct, to the deficiency of language and the impossibility of not
speaking. The speaker tries to come close to the past. And in this attempt she is
not alone. It was a single ‘T’ that had to choose, and still a single ‘T’ that moved
to be part of that ordeal
whose darkness is
only now reaching me from those fields,
those rivers, those roads clotted as
firmaments with the dead.™
But there are others where she chose to move: ‘And we are too late. We are
always too late.’ Those who experience the loss of community form themselves
Into community.
12 Object Lessons 38.
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